The legal position of a sperm donor is complex. In the past, it has been suggested that a sperm donor should have no legal rights to a child conceived by donor insemination. However, in the UK an amendment to Section 31 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1511 removed anonymity from gamete donors. Section 31 now provides that at the age of 18 years, a person conceived using donor gametes acquires the right to information about the identity of their biological parents. It is, therefore, subsequently possible for donor-conceived children to make contact with their biological father and meet their donor and donor-related siblings. Should a donor have the reciprocal opportunity to contact his children?

UK legislation passed into law in April 2009 states that, in cases where the woman is married or in a civil partnership, and her husband or civil partner has consented to the treatment, it can be the husband or civil partner who is registered as the second legal parent. They can be named as such on the birth certificate. The sperm donor is not regarded as a legal parent of the child. The legislation protects the donor from being treated as the legal father of a donor-conceived child even if the woman's partner refuses, or subsequently withdraws his consent, to be treated as the father of the child (HFEA 2008, ss. 38[1] and 41[1]).

However, in the case of Re Z (A Child) (2013) EWHC 134 (Fam), two gay men, who were biological fathers to two children (with two lesbian couples) applied leave under the Children Act 1989 section 8 for contact and residence orders. The two lesbian couples contended that it was the intention of Parliament to protect same-sex families who had conceived with sperm donors and their status as parents should be exclusive and absolute. However, the sperm donors argued that the 2008 Act did not eradicate their status as genetic parents, who should be allowed by the court to play a role in the life of their biological offspring. A key factor was that the two men had initially been allowed by the lesbian couples to make contact with each child, but that permission had subsequently been withdrawn. The court judgement was that the men had made a good case and they were granted leave to make applications for contact orders in respect of both children (although one of the men was refused leave to apply for a residence order).

This case has raised the possibility that a sperm donor who no longer wishes to be anonymous, could apply for contact with his biological children. There is evidence that allowing the offspring of donor insemination to know and contact their biological fathers has reduced the number of men willing to donate sperm via regulated agencies. Allowing a reciprocal right of donors to contact their offspring might make women less willing to accept donation via such agencies and encourage them to resort to unregulated sperm donation, currently advertised on a multiplicity of websites. This might decrease, rather than increase, protections for children conceived by donation.